From 2000-2009, the Detroit Lions compiled a miserable 42-118 record for a .263 winning percentage. Over that same period, the New England Patriots boasted a far more marketable 112-48 record for a .700 winning percentage.
The Lions' loathsome winning percentage over the past decade has translated into an average draft position well inside the top ten of the league, with only two picks falling outside of that range. The Patriots, conversely, routinely have drafted outside of the top ten of the draft over the past decade, three times selecting in the bottom third of round one and once having no first-round pick.
Take away the names of these two teams and the casual observer might assume that team one, the Lions, had amassed a stock pile of talent, while team two, the Patriots, had had many more first-round misses.
Sadly, for Lions' fans and other fans similarly situated, quite the opposite has been true. Of the Patriots' first-round picks over the past decade, all are still in the league and all but two, Richard Seymour and Daniel Graham, the Patriots' 2001 and 2002 draft picks, respectively, are still productive NFL players.
Of the Lions' first-round picks since 2001, five are no longer with the team, two are no longer in the NFL, and one more is on his way out of the league.
Not surprisingly, the players that Detroit has selected high in the draft over the past decade and that have not panned out have, with the exception of Ernie Sims, been so-called "skill-position" players, playing either wide-receiver or quarterback. That's an argument against both drafting skill-position players high in the draft and making bad decisions, as Lions' GM Matt Millen routinely was wont to do.
The more glaring lesson, however, is found not in the Lions' failed picks but in the cost of those picks. Setting aside the high base salaries which are not guaranteed in the NFL, NFL teams that routinely select high in the draft, as the Lions routinely do, pay a far more handsome price for their picks than do the rest of the teams in the league.
From 2001-2009, the Lions spent approximately $157 million in guaranteed money alone on their first round picks. This year, they likely will add $26-32 million to that total in signing first-round pick and number two overall selection, Ndamukong Suh.
Compare that figure to that of the Patriots, which, during the same period, spent a far more earthly $43.52 million on salary bonuses for their first-round picks. That's nearly $114 million less over the decade that the Patriots had to guarantee than did the Lions.
The lavish bonus money that the Lions routinely have doled out to first-round picks over the past decade has cost the Lions not only in the pocketbook, but also on the field. With so much cap space devoted to high picks, the Lions, with the exception of uncapped years such as this year, annually are left wanting for cap space to sign players not selected by the team in round one. The Patriots, meanwhile, have ample cap space to sign whomever they wish and, because of their continuing success, are even able to sign some stars at clearly discount rates. The cycle, thus, deepens for the Lions while breezing along for the Patriots.
Add to this depressing disparity for Lions' fans the fact that the Patriots fared far better not only than the Lions but also than most other NFL teams in selecting their first round talent over the past decade, and there is serious reason to wonder why most teams do not spend their money on quality personnel evaluators and trade out of the top half of the draft. Presumably, that is yet another point of distinction between successful and unsuccessful franchises.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Sunday, April 25, 2010
But Ours Goes Up to Eleven
Those who religiously follow the NFL draft, and, more specifically, those who religiously follow the Minnesota Vikings can attest to the fact that the Vikings failed to show for this year's draft. That's not to say that the Vikings might not make something out of the players that they drafted this year, but, almost certainly, they could have done far better--at first blush and probably with the benefit of time and hindsight.
Minnesota's problems began with some unexpected trading up the draft board that allowed other teams to take many of the players whom the Vikings coveted. The team's problems were accentuated, however, when just enough of the Vikings' primary targets remained on the big board to give the team's draft wonks hope that they could drop out of the first round, pick up some middle round pick, and still get the player that they wanted.
Of course, things did not work out as well as the Vikings had hoped--a common occurrence when one hopes for the best case scenario and something less than that suffices to foil one's most modest plans. That left the Vikings holding the bag but without anything yet in the bag. After that, the Vikings panicked, picking a cornerback widely regarded as a player that would be on the board when the Vikings selected at 62 (the team's original second-round slot) and possibly much later, and panicked even more by trading up to take a running back that may or may not be suited for a large role in the NFL.
After day two of the draft, the Vikings, thus, were left with a true reach at the top of the second round--a player who might not even be capable of starting for the Vikings in 2010--and a player who, by almost all accounts, is a far inferior player to two other running backs on whom the Vikings passed in favor of taking a player who could have been gotten much later. For that, the Vikings ceded their own first-, second-, and third-round picks.
If none of that makes your head yet spin or explode, consider what else the Vikings did when they played this year's draft. Prior to free-agency, the New England Patriots tendered restricted free agent, Logan Mankins, at the first- and third-round level. Mankins, a dominating offensive lineman who can play on either side of the ball would have solidified the Vikings' offensive line to an extent not seen in Minnesota perhaps ever. Signing Mankins would have required some work--perhaps another poison pill--$15-20 million in guaranteed money, and a first- and third-round pick. But the doing was not the devil in the details.
For the Vikings, as for most other teams, the hurdle in signing a restricted free-agent of Mankins' caliber was in parting with the draft picks. Two high draft picks are the things of which good teams are made.
Apparently, however, the Vikings do not so highly covet their high picks. That's why they bandy them about like monopoly money when maneuvering for players for whom no maneuvering is required. And that's why, now, even more than prior to the draft, a first- and a third-round pick in this year's draft sure seem like they would have been draft picks well spent as the price for the Vikings having acquired Mankins. Given a ledger of Mankins and a second-round pick to fill a need versus what the Vikings hauled in rounds one and two of this year's draft, Mankins and a second-round pick sure look good.
Up Next: Doing Detroit.
Minnesota's problems began with some unexpected trading up the draft board that allowed other teams to take many of the players whom the Vikings coveted. The team's problems were accentuated, however, when just enough of the Vikings' primary targets remained on the big board to give the team's draft wonks hope that they could drop out of the first round, pick up some middle round pick, and still get the player that they wanted.
Of course, things did not work out as well as the Vikings had hoped--a common occurrence when one hopes for the best case scenario and something less than that suffices to foil one's most modest plans. That left the Vikings holding the bag but without anything yet in the bag. After that, the Vikings panicked, picking a cornerback widely regarded as a player that would be on the board when the Vikings selected at 62 (the team's original second-round slot) and possibly much later, and panicked even more by trading up to take a running back that may or may not be suited for a large role in the NFL.
After day two of the draft, the Vikings, thus, were left with a true reach at the top of the second round--a player who might not even be capable of starting for the Vikings in 2010--and a player who, by almost all accounts, is a far inferior player to two other running backs on whom the Vikings passed in favor of taking a player who could have been gotten much later. For that, the Vikings ceded their own first-, second-, and third-round picks.
If none of that makes your head yet spin or explode, consider what else the Vikings did when they played this year's draft. Prior to free-agency, the New England Patriots tendered restricted free agent, Logan Mankins, at the first- and third-round level. Mankins, a dominating offensive lineman who can play on either side of the ball would have solidified the Vikings' offensive line to an extent not seen in Minnesota perhaps ever. Signing Mankins would have required some work--perhaps another poison pill--$15-20 million in guaranteed money, and a first- and third-round pick. But the doing was not the devil in the details.
For the Vikings, as for most other teams, the hurdle in signing a restricted free-agent of Mankins' caliber was in parting with the draft picks. Two high draft picks are the things of which good teams are made.
Apparently, however, the Vikings do not so highly covet their high picks. That's why they bandy them about like monopoly money when maneuvering for players for whom no maneuvering is required. And that's why, now, even more than prior to the draft, a first- and a third-round pick in this year's draft sure seem like they would have been draft picks well spent as the price for the Vikings having acquired Mankins. Given a ledger of Mankins and a second-round pick to fill a need versus what the Vikings hauled in rounds one and two of this year's draft, Mankins and a second-round pick sure look good.
Up Next: Doing Detroit.
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